(I) The Eye, Forms, and the Form Realm: None of the Three Exists （一）眼、色、色界，三处都无
Writings of Master Yuanyin | 2018-06-10 | Download | AI assisted translation
| “阿难，如汝所明，眼色为缘，生于眼识。此识为复因眼所生、以眼为界？因色所生、以色为界？” |
“Ānanda, as you understand it, the eye and forms are conditions for the arising of eye-consciousness. Does this consciousness arise from the eye, taking the eye as its boundary? Or does it arise from forms, taking forms as its boundary?” |
| 阿难，正如你所知道的，“眼色为缘，生于眼识”。眼识是根对色接触之后生出来的，所以说眼色为缘，生于眼识。识是了别，使你知道看见的是什么东西，眼识生出来了，我们就可以看见一切东西，外面的男女老少、饮食起居、事事物物都能看得见。 |
Ānanda, as you understand it, “the eye and forms are conditions for the arising of eye-consciousness.” Eye-consciousness arises after the sense faculty comes into contact with forms; hence it is said that the eye and forms are conditions for the arising of eye-consciousness. Consciousness discerns, enabling you to know what it is that you see. Once eye-consciousness arises, we can see all things: men and women, young and old, food and daily activities, and all manner of objects outside us. |
| “此识为复因眼所生、以眼为界？”这个眼识是不是从眼睛所生，以眼为界呢？这句话的意思是说，眼睛生出来的东西，只能是眼睛，不应该是眼睛以外的东西。 |
“Does this consciousness arise from the eye, taking the eye as its boundary?” Does this eye-consciousness arise from the eye and take the eye as its boundary? This means that what is produced by the eye can only be the eye itself; it should not be something other than the eye. |
| 譬如狗生出来是狗，猫生出来是猫，那么眼睛所生出来的东西，当然还是眼睛。既然同于眼睛，只能以眼为界，不会是眼睛之外的东西。就像猫生出来的是猫，不可能到狗界中去；狗生出来的是狗，也不可能到猫界中去。 |
For example, what a dog produces is a dog, and what a cat produces is a cat. Thus, what the eye produces must of course still be the eye. Since it is the same in nature as the eye, it can only take the eye as its boundary; it cannot be something outside the eye. Just as what a cat produces is a cat and cannot enter the domain of dogs, what a dog produces is a dog and cannot enter the domain of cats. |
| 如果这个眼识是眼所生，那么即等同于眼睛，既然以眼为界，应该只见眼睛，而不能见眼睛以外的色相。 |
If this eye-consciousness were produced by the eye, it would be identical with the eye. Since it takes the eye as its boundary, it should see only the eye and could not see forms outside the eye. |
| 如果不是从眼所生，那么会不会“因色所生，以色为界”？假如眼识不是眼睛生的，那是不是由外面色尘而生，以这个色尘为界呢？假如是外面色尘所生，色尘所生的东西也一样都是色尘，在色尘之外不应该再有别的东西。 |
If it does not arise from the eye, then could it “arise from forms, taking forms as its boundary”? If eye-consciousness is not produced by the eye, does it arise from external sensory forms and take those forms as its boundary? If it were produced by external sensory forms, then what forms produce would likewise all be forms; beyond forms, there should be nothing else. |
| 假如是以色为界，就只能见色，而不能见空。空与色是相对的，如见空即违色，违色就不是色所生。在色与空之间有一个这样的界限。 |
If it takes forms as its boundary, it can see only forms and cannot see emptiness. Emptiness and form are opposites: to see emptiness would contradict form, and what contradicts form cannot be produced by forms. There is such a boundary between form and emptiness. |
| 十八界主要是在讲六识，但是如果不与根尘连在一起说，就不能做详细的分别。就像我们刚才说的，一片田地，假如没有田埂，你就不能分清哪块地是谁的。如果用田埂隔开了，你就知道：噢！这一块是我的，那一块是你的。六识与根尘连在一起讨论，根尘就是十二处。由于十二处已经被破掉了，再破十八界也就好懂了。 |
The eighteen realms are chiefly concerned with the six consciousnesses. Yet unless they are discussed together with the sense faculties and sensory objects, they cannot be analyzed in detail. As we said just now, if a field has no ridges, you cannot distinguish whose plot is whose. If ridges divide it, you know: “Oh, this plot is mine, and that one is yours.” The six consciousnesses are discussed together with the sense faculties and sensory objects; the faculties and objects are the twelve sense bases. Since the twelve sense bases have already been refuted, it is easier to understand the refutation of the eighteen realms as well. |
| “阿难，若因眼生，既无色空，无可分别，纵有汝识，欲将何用？汝见又非青黄赤白，无所表示，从何立界？” |
“Ānanda, if it arises from the eye, then in the absence of form and emptiness there would be nothing to discriminate. Even if you possessed consciousness, what use would it be? Moreover, your seeing is neither blue, yellow, red, nor white; it has nothing by which it can be indicated. From what, then, could a boundary be established?” |
| 这里要做进一步分析了。“若因眼生，既无色空，无可分别。 |
Here a further analysis is needed. |
| ”假如眼识是眼所生出来的，这个眼睛哪里有色，哪里有空呢？我们每个人的眼睛无色又无空，既然无色无空你分别什么东西呀？因为有色有空才去分别，你面前究竟是猫还是狗，是桌子还是椅子，可以通过色相的差别区分开来。 |
“If it arises from the eye, then in the absence of form and emptiness there would be nothing to discriminate.” If eye-consciousness were produced by the eye, where would there be form or emptiness in the eye? Each person's eye contains neither form nor emptiness. Since there is neither form nor emptiness, what could you discriminate? It is only because there are form and emptiness that discrimination occurs: whether before you is a cat or a dog, a table or a chair, can be distinguished through differences in appearance. |
| 假如没有色只有空会怎么样？对于空与色之间的关系，我们说过是因空显色，因色显空，如果空里没有色，那么这个空又因何建立呢？又能有什么分别呢？所以眼识离开色空，就无可分别。 |
What if there were no form, but only emptiness? Regarding the relation between emptiness and form, we have said that form is revealed through emptiness and emptiness is revealed through form. If there were no form within emptiness, on what basis could that emptiness be established? And what distinctions could there be? Thus, apart from form and emptiness, eye-consciousness has nothing to discriminate. |
| “纵有汝识，欲将何用？”眼识是要依靠分别、了别来起作用的，如果没有一个可供分别的对象，你眼睛所生的这个眼识就派不上用场，有也就等于没有，所以说纵有汝识，欲将何用？就算你离开色空之外真的有这个眼识，有这 |
“Even if you possessed consciousness, what use would it be?” Eye-consciousness functions by relying on discrimination and discernment. If there is no object to be discriminated, then the eye-consciousness produced by your eye has no use; its existence is equivalent to nonexistence. Hence it is said, “Even if you possessed consciousness, what use would it be?” Even if, apart from form and emptiness, this eye-consciousness truly exists... |
| 个能力和能量在，但是没有色空，你能拿它来分别什么东西呢？没有东西你能见什么呢？根本就起不了这个作用啊！光有这个能见还不行，还要有所见才能起作用，否则就是有也等于没有。 |
...and possesses such capacity and energy, without form and emptiness, what could you use it to discriminate? If there is nothing, what could you see? It could not function at all. The capacity to see alone is not enough; there must also be something seen for it to function. Otherwise, its existence is equivalent to nonexistence. |
| “汝见又非青黄赤白，无所表示。 |
“Moreover, your seeing is neither blue, yellow, red, nor white; it has nothing by which it can be indicated.” |
| ”就是纵然你有个见在，但你这个见不是青黄赤白，不是长短方圆，不是冷暖涩滑，没有任何名相和概念可以表述它、形容它，一切东西都没有，那么它“从何立界”呢？我们平时所说的每一样东西，都可以用它特殊的属性来加 |
That is, even if you have seeing, this seeing is neither blue, yellow, red, nor white; neither long nor short, square nor round; neither cold nor warm, rough nor smooth. There are no names, appearances, or concepts by which it can be expressed or described. If it has none of these things, then from what could its boundary be established? Everything we ordinarily speak of can be expressed and distinguished by its particular qualities, whereas your seeing has none of these qualities and cannot be indicated at all. |
| 以表述、区别，而你这个见一切都没有，根本就无从表示，无从表示就等于没有，既然没有又从何立界？你怎样给它界定呢？有东西可以划界限，到这里为界，那边是你的，这边是我的。如果没有东西，这个界限即无从建立。既然无从表示，界限自然就没有了。 |
If it cannot be indicated, that is equivalent to its not existing. Since it does not exist, how could a boundary be established? How could you define it? When there is something, a boundary can be drawn: up to here is the boundary; that side is yours, and this side is mine. But if there is nothing, no such boundary can be established. Since it cannot be indicated, the boundary naturally does not exist. |
| “若因色生，空无色时，汝识应灭，” |
“If it arises from forms, then when emptiness is without form, your consciousness should cease.” |
| 我们前面说过，被生出来的东西的性质，与生它的那个东西在本体上应该一样，不应当有二致。假如说这眼识因种种色境而起，是从色境上生的，那么这个识只应见色，而不应见空，当空来的时候你的眼识也应当灭掉。既然眼识没有了，那么： |
We have said earlier that what is produced should, in its essential nature, be the same as that which produces it; there should not be any difference. If this eye-consciousness arises through the various sensory forms and is produced from those forms, then this consciousness should see only forms and should not see emptiness. When emptiness appears, your eye-consciousness should also cease. Since eye-consciousness would then be absent: |
| “云何识知是虚空性？” |
“How would consciousness know that it is the nature of emptiness?” |
| 如果没有色就没有识了，你怎么会知道虚空性呢？这就说明眼识不是从色所生，不是由外面色境生出来的。 |
If there were no form, there would be no consciousness; so how could you know the nature of emptiness? This shows that eye-consciousness is not produced from forms or from external sensory objects. |
| “若色变时，汝亦识其色相迁变，汝识不迁，界从何立？” |
“When forms change, you also know that their appearances are changing. Yet your consciousness does not change; from what, then, could a boundary be established?” |
| 这个变即是生住异灭，因为每一样东西生出之后，都要经历由生而住、而异、而灭的过程。就像人一样，离开母体以后，都会慢慢由小而少、由少而壮、由壮而老，最后由老而死。“若色变时，汝亦识其色相迁变。 |
This change means arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation. After every thing comes into being, it must undergo the process of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing. People are the same: after leaving the mother's body, they gradually proceed from childhood to youth, from youth to maturity, from maturity to old age, and finally from old age to death. “When forms change, you also know that their appearances are changing.” |
| ”这个色境也是如此，在不断地起变化，不但现在的色相你知道，就是它起变化的时候，你也知道它在变化。 |
Sensory forms are likewise constantly changing. You know not only their present appearances; when they change, you also know that they are changing. |
| “汝识不迁，界从何立？”前面佛问国王，你三岁时见的恒河与六十岁见的一样吗？有什么变化没有？国王说我六十岁所见恒河，与我三岁时见的恒河一样，因为这个识性不会随着岁月的流逝而变迁。 |
“Yet your consciousness does not change; from what, then, could a boundary be established?” Earlier, the Buddha asked the king whether the Ganges he saw at the age of three was the same as the one he saw at sixty, and whether there had been any change. The king replied that the Ganges he saw at sixty was the same as the one he had seen at three, because the nature of consciousness does not change with the passage of years. |
| 既然你这个识不会随色而变，那从什么地方去立界呢？你的眼识好比是一块田，色相就像田里的田埂，如果田埂总是调来调去，那么这个界限即无法安立。既然色相是变迁的，可以随时变来变去，而你的眼识是不动的，这个界限当然也立不住了。 |
Since your consciousness does not change along with forms, from where could a boundary be established? Your eye-consciousness is like a field, while appearances are like the ridges within it. If the ridges are constantly moved about, the boundary cannot be established. Since appearances are changing and may alter at any time, while your eye-consciousness remains unmoving, this boundary certainly cannot stand. |
| “从变则变，界相自无。” |
“If it changes along with them, then the very appearance of a boundary does not exist.” |
| 既然一个变，一个不变，界限立不住，那么现在反过来假设会怎么样呢？假如说色相变了，你的眼识也跟着变。一切东西都在变来变去，你连应该怎样划界都定不下来，所以说“界相自无”。刚才说田埂在变，大地不变，现在大地也在跟着变，两个都在变来变去，这个界限怎么立呢？这就反过来证明眼识不是从色生的。 |
Since one changes and the other does not, the boundary cannot be established. Now consider the reverse supposition: what if appearances change and your eye-consciousness changes along with them? Everything would be continually changing, and you could not even determine how a boundary should be drawn. Thus, “the very appearance of a boundary does not exist.” Just now we said that the field ridges change while the ground does not. Now the ground changes as well; if both are continually changing, how can a boundary be established? This conversely proves that eye-consciousness is not produced from forms. |
| “不变则恒。既从色生，应不识知，虚空所在。” |
“If it does not change, then it is permanent. Since it arises from forms, it should not know where emptiness is.” |
| 假如眼识不变，是恒常的。但是眼识是从色生的呀，从色生的只应当识色，那就不应当识知虚空了。但是我们现在不是如此，我们见色观空，既能见色，又晓得空之所在，这就证明眼识不是色尘所生。 |
If eye-consciousness does not change, then it is permanent. But if eye-consciousness arises from forms, what arises from forms should recognize only forms; it should not recognize emptiness. Yet that is not how we are now: we see forms and observe emptiness; we can see forms and also know where emptiness is. This proves that eye-consciousness is not produced by sensory forms. |
| 前面讲不是眼根自己生的，不是自生，后面讲的不是色尘生的，不是他生。那么不自生、不他生，或者是合起来一起生（共生）呢？所以再假设共生： |
Earlier it was explained that it is not produced by the eye faculty itself—not self-arising. Later it was explained that it is not produced by sensory forms—not arising from another. If it arises neither from itself nor from another, might it arise from both together, through co-arising? Therefore, let us further suppose co-arising: |
| “若兼二种，眼色共生，合则中离，离则两合，体性杂乱，云何成界？” |
“If the two are combined and the eye and forms arise together, then union entails separation of the middle, while separation entails the union of two parts. Their essential natures would be confused; how could a boundary be formed?” |
| 把两种合起来了，根与色，眼根与色尘合起来生，我们来看看是不是能共生。 |
Let us combine the two—the eye faculty and sensory forms—and see whether they can arise together. |
| “合则中离。”若合起来生，当中就没有了。比如现在，两只杯子当中是一本书，要把两边的杯子合起来，当中的书就离开了，就没有当中可得了。没有当中可得，分界线就没有啦。显然不能合起来共生。那么，离开了，再共生，行不行啊？ |
“Union entails separation of the middle.” If they arise through union, there can be no middle. For example, suppose a book lies between two cups. If the cups on both sides are brought together, the book in the middle is displaced, and there is no middle to be found. If there is no middle to be found, there is no dividing line. Clearly, they cannot arise together through union. But what if they first separate and then arise together—would that work? |
| “离则两合。”若离开了生，一个生一半，眼根生一半，色尘生一半，再把这两半合起来成为眼识。这又不对了！上面说过，从眼生的，性同于眼；从色生的，性同于色。打个比方：譬如一块田，一边靠山，一边靠水。 |
“Separation entails the union of two parts.” If they arise separately, each produces one half: the eye faculty produces one half, and sensory forms produce the other half; then the two halves are joined to become eye-consciousness. This too is incorrect. As stated above, what arises from the eye has the same nature as the eye, and what arises from forms has the same nature as forms. To use an analogy, consider a field with mountains on one side and water on the other. |
| 靠山这一半田的性质是山田、高地，适合种玉米；靠水这一半田的性质是水田、低地，适合种水稻。两田性质不同，合到一起，种什么呀？一边是眼根，一边是色尘。 |
The half of the field adjoining the mountains has the nature of mountain land and high ground, suitable for planting corn; the half adjoining the water has the nature of paddy land and low ground, suitable for growing rice. The two fields have different natures. If they are joined together, what could be planted? One side is the eye faculty, and the other is sensory forms. |
| 眼根这边是有情，色尘这边是无情，有情与无情两个合起来，这可能吗？假如这样，就“体性杂乱，云何成界？”一半有情，一半无情，有情与无情怎么能合在一起，这就乱了套啦，这不可能啊。这就是说不能共生。 |
On the side of the eye faculty there is sentience, while on the side of the visual object there is insentience. Can sentience and insentience be joined together? If so, then “their natures would be mixed and confused; how could a realm be formed?” One half would be sentient and the other half insentient. How could sentience and insentience come together? It would be a complete muddle; this is impossible. This means that they cannot arise together. |
| 那么，眼识是凭空产生的吗？也不是啊！这就是“不无因生”。不自生、不他生、不共生、不无因生，“是故说无生”，那就是无生了。了了见，无所见，根、尘、识三都不可得。都不可得故，就是菩提妙净明体，就是如来藏妙真如性。 |
Then does eye consciousness arise out of nowhere? No, it does not. This is “not arising without a cause.” Not arising from itself, not arising from another, not arising together, and not arising without a cause—“therefore it is said to be unborn.” That is unbornness. One sees with perfect clarity, yet there is nothing to be seen; the faculty, object, and consciousness are all unobtainable. Because they are all unobtainable, this is the wondrous pure and luminous essence of bodhi, the wondrous true suchness-nature of the Tathāgata-garbha. |
| “是故当知，眼色为缘，生眼识界，三处都无。则眼与色及色界三，本非因缘、非自然性。” |
“Therefore, you should know that the eye and form serve as conditions for the arising of the realm of eye consciousness, yet all three locations are absent. Thus, the three—the eye, form, and the realm of form—are fundamentally neither causal conditions nor spontaneous nature.” |
| 从根生不可得，从色生不可得，从共生也不可得。都不可得之故，你的“眼色为缘，生眼识界”这个知见，是不对的。眼、色、眼识，三处都是没有的。你晓得的这个知见只是通俗说法，执有的人通常都会这样看。 |
It cannot be found to arise from the faculty, cannot be found to arise from form, and cannot be found to arise from their joint arising. Since none can be found, your view that “the eye and form serve as conditions for the arising of the realm of eye consciousness” is incorrect. The eye, form, and eye consciousness—the three locations—are all absent. The view you understand is merely a conventional way of speaking; those attached to existence generally see things this way. |
| 照佛的眼光看来，一切都无。我们说西方极乐世界也是没有。这个没有，正是显真心、显真菩提心，不要误解这句话，理解成断灭啊。正当说“三处都无”时，我们的眼睛不是明明能看见东西吗？我们眼前，有男女老少。 |
From the Buddha’s perspective, everything is absent. We say that the Western Land of Ultimate Bliss is also absent. This absence is precisely what reveals the true mind and the true bodhicitta. Do not misunderstand these words as annihilationism. Just when we say that “all three locations are absent,” do our eyes not plainly see things? Before our eyes are men, women, the old, and the young. |
| 这房间里，你看多少东西，形形色色，桌子、床、橱柜，什么都有，这个假相不无。所以西方极乐世界也是有。其实是这样的：方便说是有，彻底说是无，究竟说来，是非空非有、非有非空，两边都不可得。说有说无、说真说假，都是你自己的分别心，都没有说到本体。说到本体，无可说处，没有你开口处。 |
Look at how many things there are in this room—things of every kind: tables, beds, cabinets, everything. These illusory appearances are not absent. Thus, the Western Land of Ultimate Bliss also exists. In fact, this is how it is: provisionally speaking, there is existence; speaking thoroughly, there is absence; ultimately, it is neither empty nor existent, neither existent nor empty—neither extreme can be grasped. To speak of existence or absence, truth or falsity, is all discrimination of your own mind; none of it speaks of the fundamental essence. When it comes to the fundamental essence, there is nowhere to speak; there is no place for you to open your mouth. |
| 眼根、色尘与眼识，这三样东西都没有。都没有之故，“则眼与色及色界三，本非因缘、非自然性”。色界是指眼识，眼根与色尘合起来生出眼识，所以叫做色界，这个“界”就是与根尘的分界。 |
The eye faculty, the visual object, and eye consciousness—these three things are all absent. Because they are all absent, “the three—the eye, form, and the realm of form—are fundamentally neither causal conditions nor spontaneous nature.” The realm of form refers to eye consciousness. The eye faculty and the visual object combine to give rise to eye consciousness, so it is called the realm of form; this “realm” is the division between the faculty and the object. |
| 眼根、色尘、眼识，这三样东西，本非因缘、非自然性。不自生、不他生、不共生，就是非因缘性，不无因生就是非自然性。自然而有，自己无因而生，就是自然性。不是这样，不无因生，就是非自然性。 |
The eye faculty, the visual object, and eye consciousness—these three things—are fundamentally neither causal conditions nor spontaneous nature. Not arising from itself, not arising from another, and not arising together constitute its not being causal conditions; not arising without a cause constitutes its not being spontaneous nature. To arise naturally, of itself and without a cause, is spontaneous nature. It is not like that: it does not arise without a cause, and thus it is not spontaneous nature. |
| 大家有什么问题吗？要问这个因缘生呀？ |
Does anyone have any questions? Do you want to ask about arising through causal conditions? |
| 对呀，凡所有法，都是因缘所生，怎么会不是因缘所生呢？我们刚才讲过了，不自生、不他生、不共生、不无因生，就是因缘所生。因缘所生就是无生啊。佛说的因缘生就是无生义，不是有生。 |
Yes, indeed. All dharmas arise through causal conditions, so how can they not arise through causal conditions? We have just explained this: not arising from itself, not arising from another, not arising together, and not arising without a cause—this is arising through causal conditions. Arising through causal conditions is precisely unbornness. The arising through causal conditions spoken of by the Buddha means unbornness, not actual arising. |
| 这些相都是假相，不是实有的，所以“因缘所生法，我说即是空”，是没有的。因缘所生就是无生，无生之故，还有啥因缘！就体说，是无生；就相用说，就是因缘所生。 |
All these appearances are illusory appearances; they are not truly existent. Therefore, “dharmas arising through causal conditions are, I say, emptiness”; they are absent. Arising through causal conditions is unbornness. Since they are unborn, what causal conditions could there still be? Speaking in terms of essence, they are unborn; speaking in terms of appearances and function, they arise through causal conditions. |
| 前面提到过，界是因。破界就是破因。因不可得，还有什么缘不缘的呢？须有因，才会遇到缘。因是主因，缘是助缘，因缘相聚，就会发起现行。 |
As mentioned earlier, a realm is a cause. To dismantle the realm is to dismantle the cause. If the cause is unobtainable, what conditions could there be or not be? There must first be a cause before conditions can be encountered. The cause is the primary cause, and conditions are contributing conditions. When causes and conditions come together, manifest activity arises. |
| 譬如种子，种子有生起禾苗之因，遇着泥土、遇着太阳、遇着水分这些缘，就能生起禾苗来。假如没有因，没有这颗种子，尽管有太阳、水分、泥土，又有什么用？能生起什么东西来啊？有人说，界就是因。又有人说，界是种类。比如我们平常说，你在啥地方工作？噢！我在报界。 |
Take a seed as an example. A seed contains the cause for the growth of a grain shoot. When it encounters such conditions as soil, sunlight, and moisture, it can produce a grain shoot. If there is no cause—if there is no seed—then what use are sunlight, moisture, and soil, however much of them there may be? What could they produce? Some say that a realm is a cause. Others say that a realm is a category. For example, we commonly ask, “Where do you work?” “Oh, I work in the newspaper industry.” |
| 现在讲耳识了。十八界主要是破六识，六识破了，界就破了。眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意，挨次序下来，该破耳识了。 |
Now we come to ear consciousness. The eighteen realms primarily dismantle the six consciousnesses. Once the six consciousnesses have been dismantled, the realms are dismantled. Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind proceed in sequence; now it is time to dismantle ear consciousness. |
